

DISCOURSE OF INTERFAITH CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE INDONESIAN INTERFAITH WEATHER STATION⁸

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Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station (IIWS) is one of the interfaith initiative introduced by the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS), started October 2014 and concluded in September 2015. It is an applied research that the main objective is to explore the possibility of preventing inter- and intra-religious tension and conflict in Indonesia. It is an academic exploration and practical inquiry of an early warning system that included the social analysis and digital technology intervention.

This paper is a theoretical analysis of the discourse of “conflict prevention,” its relationship with IIWS initiative, and a reflection upon this engagement. The frame of discussions is revolved around the notion of risk society and other issues such as conflict prevention and pre-emption, and the crowd sourcing.

All in all, this paper seeks the better understanding of social and religious shift in Indonesian society, and an elaboration of the viable way on mobilizing new option, such as digital technology in dealing with social problems.

Keywords: Religion in Indonesia, interfaith interaction, inter-religious conflict, prevention, early warning system, digital humanities

INTRODUCTION

It goes without saying that in the last twenty years the world is constantly stricken by melancholia. It testifies the increasing threats of global terrorism, inter-communal conflicts, communicable diseases,

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social uprisings, inter-state tensions, natural disasters, environmental devastations: we are living, as contended by Gabe Mythen, in a “runaway world” (Mythen, 2004, pp. 1–2). Those are either the resultant of the globalized, networked and paradoxically neo-national tribalized society (cf. James, 2006, p. 13), or simply mirroring the domestic and regional headaches.

Indonesia is no different from other countries in attempting to keep its head above the water. Series of social and natural disasters are inflicting this country. The recent years, especially in the aftermath of historical watershed that kicked the legs of the New Order’s scaffold in 1998, Indonesia underwent a critical transition. A new celebrated era – *Era Reformasi* (Reformation Era) – was bringing a new social space, in particular for the repressed voices, and a bumpy take-off to democracy.

With hindsight, like opening Pandora’s Box, which unleashed the evil spirits, the era was also the beginning of the subsequent social tensions and unrests. Some of them are simply an extension of the unresolved problems that during the New Order administration was strongly subdued. Some other appeared in new forms of politics of space and of Othering, such as “*politik aliran*” (ideological/religious-based politics), the emergence of hardline religious groups, and transnational religious discourse, which to a point chipped in for the domestic tension among religious groups.

Besides, the intra-/inter-communal, intra-/inter-religious tensions that already claimed thousands of lives, the pitfalls came from the government discriminatory policy in which on many occasions materialized on the street by violence act against “undesirable” elements of society, such as religious dissidents and minority groups.

Observing numerous inter-religious conflicts since the beginning of Reformation Era illustrated the vulnerability of social interaction, to which some of them was much of discomfiture of the state apparatus, as in some cases it even parts of the problem. In cases such as dispute on the legality of house of worship, religious defamation, intra-religious tension, Shari’a law establishment, domestic violence, communal violence, and other cases, state apparatus contributed significant number in the involvement of the violence act (Cholil, 2014; Institut Titian Perdamaian, 2014). This in the end only emphasizes the limitation of the state control of social interaction and highlights the importance of drawing larger support from civil society to take a part in the resolution of these complicated issues. To say the least, a linked-and-matched initiative is in a great demand to connect all social stakeholders.

Against the above backdrop, numerous initiatives to cope with social tension have been put forward. Indonesian Interfaith Weather

Station (heretofore, IIWS) is one of the initiatives introduced by the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (heretofore, ICRS). IIWS is an applied research that the main objective is to explore the possibility of preventing inter- and intra-religious tension and conflict in Indonesia. It is, furthermore an academic exploration and practical inquiry of an early warning system that included the social analysis and the possible digital technology intervention on socio-religious issues.

The present paper is a theoretical analysis of the discourse of “conflict prevention,” its relationship with IIWS initiative. Since I myself is part of the program as a researcher, the paper is also my critical reflection upon this engagement. The frame of discussions is revolved around the notion of risk society and other issues such as conflict prevention and pre-emption, and the crowd sourcing. In this, I will address a number of questions: What are the challenges in implementing an early warning system such as IIWS against the complex social context of Indonesia? To what degree a digital technology could help preventing and mitigating intra- and inter-religious conflict in Indonesia? As methodology and academic inquiry, does IIWS a confirmation of the notion of “risk society” as proposed by Ulrich Beck and others? What is the options available for IIWS that could deprive the sceptre of that “risky” society?

Risk and Prevention

The string of terms distilled in the “Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station” is pregnant with meanings and it can be considered as the surface of stratified layers of more profound concepts and understandings to delve into. The string is related to the notions of “community” and “society” as the basic understanding of “interfaith community.” The “weather station” is connected to the notion of “risk” and “danger” as to “prevention,” “preemption,” and “mitigation.”

Risk is not synonymous with catastrophe or disaster; it foregrounding the catastrophe. By perceiving it, is a way people make sense the past catastrophe and anticipating the future one. Perception of risk is a formation of knowledge, an imagination and a projection of the future occurrences and possibilities, no matter it came from the instinctual mechanism (based on complex memory process), rigid calculation, or divine sanction. “Risks are always future events that *may* occur, that *threaten* us” (Beck, 2009, p. 9, original emphasis). It is an abstraction of what constitutes danger, threats, and the implicated subject (for whom). In other word, constructing risk is manufacturing/defining/thematizing the future uncertainties.

Risks, dangers, insecurities, threats, and the catastrophes itself are always part of human condition and history. Since the early humanity, never was the world free from large and small scale of catastrophes, wars, pestilences, hungers, and other miseries. However, in the modern days the risks are escalated, unprecedented in human history, such as global terror, transnational risks, and also the emergence of human-/technological-induced catastrophes, such as chemical carcinogen, chemical pollution, nuclear radiation, greenhouse effect, Internet cracking, millennium bug. These are part of radicalization of modernity: “we face the amounted risks not because we are less modern, but because we are hypermodern.”

How those dangerous events and risks perceived is part of social organization, socially and culturally constructed (Beck, 2009; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Nelkin, 2003). The perception of risk as an anticipation and/or estimation of likelihood of harm are running in a complex system of beliefs and related to our self-image, of our cultural perceptions. There is a selective process of how culture defined “danger” and “risk” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983, p. 186). Furthermore, Dorothy Nelkin observes that “[N]arratives of risk are pervaded by concepts of accountability, responsibility, liability, and blame” (Nelkin, 2003, p. viii). As a result, the perception of risk is not innocence, and its implications involve politics, ethics and morality (Adam & van Loon, 2000, p. 1). Cultural filter is also structuring the order of the self and the Other. This may explain why certain conflicting news attracts more attention than others and drew different responses. There is a democratization of infliction and dramatization of risk imagery, i.e. contagiousness beyond borders, to which it makes the image of risk of one disaster more visible than other.

This modern stage of risk society is also bringing another specter that is the social injustice. Given the power relations of global society, risk is instead a socially constructed and staged phenomenon through and through in which some have the capacity to define risk and others do not. The class divide runs between those who have the power to define their self-produces risks and those who are exposed to, or at the mercy of, risks over which others decide. This risk-based difference increasingly overlays, aggravates or replaces the old class divisions as the original and intrinsic form of inequality. Thus risk is another word for power and domination (Beck, 2009, p. 142).

Tolikara case that drew national attention some months ago is an example of such dramatization of risk imagery and social injustice in a risk society. The incident was taken place in Papua but the echo reverberated in other parts in Indonesia, since it touched the most

sensitive issue in Indonesia, religion. IWS monitoring officers in Sulawesi (Makassar and Poso) reported the increasing inflammatory social media replication messages – mostly in negative tone – and possible mass mobilization, only few hours after the incident. This accentuated the unpredictability of the public mood that could worsen the situation and broaden the conflict beyond the incident site. Among numerous social problems in Indonesia appeared in media during the period, Tolikara stood prominently because it is a reflection of the unresolved problems: radicalization and politicization of religion in public sphere, hidden inter-religious tension, the marginalization of Papuans within Indonesian developmentalism, but also it displayed the resilience of some civil society groups in coping with provocative agenda.

Despite its dreadful nature in the people mind, risk provides to us “windows into how societies express and define themselves” (Fischhoff & Kadwany, 2011). It is an opportunity to manage the uncertainty and pragmatically, a way to test a policymaking and to promote a moral reflection. “Only in retrospect does it become apparent that the calculability of risks has a moral basis” (Beck, 2009, p. 14). Hence, risk is related not only to danger, threat, and catastrophe, but to chance and opportunity. Thus, the discourse of risk is productive, expansive, and transformative. It also reflective in the sense that is to cope with decidable future in the present, it balances those danger and chance (Beck, 2009, p. 19).

In the increasingly dangerous world, partly as the consequence of modernity as the earlier part arguing, the act of preemption and prevention is never more important. This is no by any means a new human enterprise. Since early of civilizations, seers and prophets predicted the coming dangers: flood, volcano eruption, even the coming of alien invaders. This, however, never been so seriously taken in the present day in the increasing conflict and other security threats (Dershowitz, 2006, p. 2ff.): the cliché “better safe than sorry” prevailed.

The notions of “prevention” and “preemption” as academic categories are mostly derived from military experiences and strategies, as we learnt about “preventive” and “preemptive” wars (Rodin & Shue, 2007, p. 2ff.). The application of the notions on the interfaith weather station is therefore need to be refined in carefully wrought employment.

Taking the example of war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11, Michael Walzer, an American political philosopher made a distinction between “preemptive” and “preventive” wars exercised by the United States government, both in negative tones. He challenged the reflexive tendency of the meaning of preemption in a war as a self-defense act

against the enemy for the reason of the clear and present threat (Walzer 2004, 146ff.; 2006, 74ff.; see also the critique of Rodin [2007, 113–170]). Preventive war, Walzer argued “presupposes some standard against which danger is to be measured.” The problem is that “the standard” is entirely in the realm of perception and little to do with the immediate threat. It is arguably, based on the idea of a “balance of power.” This kind of war is necessary simply because of the presumed condition of imbalance that justifies the war: “the enemy has begun the process and/or it is [getting] stronger than us.” Accordingly, the preemptive strike is meant to gain the “former” balance. The perception is obvious in the United States Department of Defense’s definition of preventive war, i.e. “a war initiated in the *belief* that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk” (quoted in Bzostek, 2008, p. 4, my emphasis). The element of “belief” is significant in defining certain condition is a threat for a future balance of power.

The other side of the some doctrine on the preemptive military initiative, the National Defense Strategy’s paper published by the United States Joint Chief of Staff stated that “[t]he *potentially catastrophic impact* of an attack against the United States, its allies and its interests may necessitate actions in self-defense *to preempt* adversaries before they can attack” (quoted in Bzostek, 2008, p. 221, my emphasis). Here again we hear the amplification of taking the threat as part of the “belief” on it and this is the prime example of risk as institutional construction.

Along with that the idea of preemptive strike is dealing with the presumed “sufficient threat.” This is as displayed by Walzer, another complicated issues since provocation by the enemy is not necessarily an intention to engage war (Walzer, 2006, pp. 80–81). “[P]reemption is not an accurate description of what ... is threatening,” he further induced (Walzer, 2004, p. 146). He critically assessed that the Iraq War was not a preemptive war, since it is beyond imagination that Iraq is an immediate threat for American national security. It is “preventive, not preemptive – it is designed to respond to a more distant threat” (Walzer, 2004, p. 146, original emphasis). Hence, according to him preventive means a measure taken to address a distant threat, while preemption means cheating a momentum to outstrip the other party by taking the preeminence position over it. Both are a move from the traditional understanding of self-defense. It is no more a reactionary policy, it is proactionary.

In certain sense the response of the Bush’s administration toward the 9/11 tragedy by initiating the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 could be framed as well in the “traumatic framework,” in which the former Cold War is part of the equation. In the United States history the

Japanese attack to Pearl Harbor in August 1944 set the precedence of this military response on terrorism in the American home ground – the other was Mexican-American War (1846-1848). In the pre-Cold War era, preemptive strike is considered immoral (Rodin & Shue, 2007, p. 2f.). Nonetheless the post-World War II and the emergence of the Cold War with its nuclear deterrence, the notion of prevention and preemption was found its footing and later on became the basis for the United States political thinking and military doctrine.

How both concepts of preventive and preemptive become useful notions for a non-militaristic context, in the interfaith context? The perception of “balance of power” as a precondition of both initiatives could be an important point of departure for IIWS to proactively detect the changing interfaith interaction atmosphere. While it is true that the perception is not necessarily the threat itself this perception is important as the threshold for moving to another stage of threat condition: to recognize the potential of vicious circle starting to initiate.

A quick observation among the survivors of inter-communal and interfaith conflicts in the aftermath indicated a tendency to praise the harmonious relationship among the conflicting parties in the antecedent period leading to the conflict. While this sentiment largely simplifying the complicated interaction in the pre-conflict period, the feeling upon the importance of “social balance” is a significant feeding for the initiation of preventive and preemptive measures. For the understanding of social balance, it gives at least double opportunities to handle the incident, i.e. to begin prevention and/or preemption initiatives, and to seek a new “social balance,” at least the category understood by the implicated parties.

Lastly, the “traumatic frame” might also be a feeding element in preventing the escalation of conflict. Beneath the conflicts in Indonesia laid the graves of “traumas” indwelled the mind of many victims and perpetrators. From this a future conflict might be a catalyst of those unfinished business. It is important to recognize this dormant monster and to take necessary initiatives.

IIWS: Preventing Conflict in the Post-Secure Era

Stated in the IIWS Concept Paper, in a more refined and elaborated account, the main objectives of the IIWS are the following (Sofjan, 2014):

1. To build an early warning system on interfaith relations in Indonesia in order to mitigate the problem of increasing religious conflicts.

2. To build awareness and enhance sensitivity among government officials at the central, provincial and local levels as well as civil society activists to help prevent the spread of intra- and inter-religious conflicts.
3. To sensitize and help develop the capacity of relevant government authorities, notably those in the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare and Ministry of Religious Affairs on how to prevent conflicts, and increase peace dividends.
4. To develop new theories, concepts and techniques on interfaith relations using time series data and geographic spread analysis.
5. To further explore the utilization of social science automation in the study of religion, interfaith relations and religious conflicts.

Those objectives demonstrated that initiative such as IWS is admittedly within the discourse of risk society and working within mostly such logic: IWS is a reflection of the past trauma and the future danger. Furthermore, dealing with prevention and pre-emption in IWS put the academicians, scientists, and government authorities in a privilege positions to “define” risks. This determines the risk knowledge that should be presented as objective, unambiguous, with highest degree of certainty, and lastly, quantifiable: a risk has to be quantifiable in order to be defined in a technological system. The initiative such as IWS is constantly haunted by the ambiguity of modernity.

On the other hands however, it is a manifestation of human desire to overcome their condition, including their risky condition by taking it as a chance and opportunity to imagining a better society that inter-religious tension is relatively manageable. To push the imagination further, there is a non-“structuralist” elements need to take into account that will be explained below, in which if properly addressed, gives a window of breath away from the cursed of modernity qua risk society.

Besides those ambitions, essentially IWS is meant to contribute to the social transformation and to enhance social remedial capacity of the civil society. The choice of “Interfaith” in IWS name is simply to limit the scope of the implementation of the prototype, i.e. intra-/inter-faith qua intra-/inter-religious interaction. The restricted scope is not to restrict the identification of social tension on the social site as oftentimes impossible to discriminate and to classify as it transcends categorization: a categorization of a tension as an inter-religious tension rather than other social tension is purely for the sake of analytical purpose, not to limit the level of responsibility.

The comparison with and the employment of the metaphor “weather station” is suggestive. Like a weather station, it functions to forecast the condition of inter-religious/interfaith interaction: whether it

is favorable, in tension, in dispute, or heading to conflict. In a distressed condition the station will raise a red flag and the information will be immediately rendering to the relevant social stakeholders, such as law enforcement, security apparatus, government officials, public figures, journalists, etc. to help them to take a necessary measure to mitigate the tension, or else to prevent it if possible. In a favorable condition the station will not go into hibernation but became an information center and a hub for the interfaith activities that ameliorate social cohesion (see Fig. 4 below). While in the ideal condition the warning should come from the public, or the “crowd”, in the IIWS prototype, it is represented by appointed monitoring officers.

Beyond a tool of mitigation and preemption, IIWS is a discourse to understand the larger issue of inter-religious interaction and of society at large. As a discourse it resisted the entirely instrumentalist approach of the procedural regime in dealing with “social pathology.” Though indeed there is amenable to this approach, it may give undue importance to security approach. Hence, IIWS is thought to be more than a diagnostic tool to the social problem.

A social engagement such as IIWS is compelled to learn from the social site and at the same time seeking transformation and induce a version of social fabrication. Moreover, the disposition is expecting to harness the relationship between action and institution (Giddens, 1987, p. 30). On the other hand, as stated in the above objectives, it has to be admitted that general public remains convinced that the state (read: bureaucracy and policymakers) is supposed to be the initiator and guide to “the intelligent action to solve social problems” (Bevir, 2012), regardless in many occasions failed to maintain impartiality. This aspiration accentuated the importance of the state apparatus as part of the resolution of social problems. Hence, an initiative such as IIWS virtually is dancing between the policymakers and the policy-implicated parties, between state system and the public.

Secondly, IIWS is an intellectual space that allowing a further meditation of human condition and social arrangement, either by acknowledging the monstrosity of humanity as “a giant destroyer machine” (cf. Rubinstein, 2003, p. 984; Supelli, 2005, p. 195) as appeared in numerous inter-religious and social conflicts, or as the peace-seeking, social integrating creatures.

Thirdly, IIWS is also an initiative that recognizes existing initiatives, in the local and national levels, and imbibes it whenever necessary. IIWS by any means is not the only and the first initiative in mitigating inter-religious conflict. By law, the task of preventing and mitigating social conflict rests upon the shoulder of the government, in

particular the security and law enforcements. The legal framework for this activity is the Law No. 7 (2012) on Social Conflict Resolution, and the Regulation No. 2 (2015) as the operational framework of the Law. Security apparatus by definition has all necessary measures, techniques, and technologies to realize the Law's mandate to prevent and mitigate a social conflict, including inter-religious conflict.

A number of religious-nuanced conflicts in the post-Reformation endorsed numerous local initiatives to cope with the problem. CEWERS (Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System) by Institut Titian Perdamaian, SNPK (*Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasaan Indonesia* – National Monitoring System of Violence in Indonesia) by The Habibie Center in cooperation with Department of Social Welfare, and CEWER by Partnership for Governance Reform. Earlier, in the late 1990s, there was an initiative to capitalize the inter-communal conflicts in the world. Administered by the Center for International Studies and the Department of International Relations at the University of Southern California, Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS) the project is “a prototype electronic database focused on enhancing the production and sharing of information across and among peacemakers in the multiple nodes of decentralized networks, linking researchers to the different societal levels at which today's conflicts, as well as conflict management and violence limitation activities, are organized.”

While sharing with the main goals of the aforementioned initiatives, IIWS is distinct in its focus on the *prevention* of an inter-religious conflict, no more on the post-factum analysis like others. Furthermore, it is distinct because of the digital technological implementation of preventive measures through the web-based information system and mobile app to provide a more engaging and user-friendly information system. The pervasive penetration of digital technology in Indonesia, notably the mobile communication – the mobile subscriptions are already exceeded Indonesian population – gives a way to the technological embrace among many people, including the people in conflicting areas.

In term of software and mobile apps, surely IIWS is not the first implementer. Ushahidi, as the kernel and platform for IIWS system is an open system that has been around since 2007 and has been implemented for different initiatives such as Afghanistan general election, Syrian refugees' information system, disaster relief, and so on. Hence, IIWS is unique in the sense of the implementation of this solution in inter-religious relationship and in its Indonesian context.

In a longer term, IIWS will embrace the public in dealing with interfaith interaction. The former top-down approach in dealing with

social problems could not stand anymore. A greater participation from the public to create resolution is seriously taking into account. To this the notion of “crowdsourcing” is put forward. Crowdsourcing is considered as “a means of organizing and coordinating the labour of individual human beings” (Grier, 2012, p. 10). As the name implied, the main actor of this engagement is “the crowd.” Ushahidi is an example of what so called crowdsourcing “paradigm.” IWS based on the belief that people – the crowds – have all good intentions to maintain social cohesion. IWS considering the individual as an actor and a social capital that will carry out the real field agent as the flag-waver of the weather station.

However, the idea of crowdsourcing is not as transparent the term claimed. The emancipation of the “crowd” into this position is far from easy. Philosopher, statesmen, religious authorities, aristocrats, and other elites never so easily give up their dominant position to the “crowd.” The crowd is irregular and not easily to herd to certain ideal, and for the present concern, the inter-communal and interfaith tension, the darkest face of this is in the form of violence act that took the “crowd” as corporeal means. According to the French writer Elias Canetti, crowd is active, living and a conscious entity (Canetti, 1981). It cannot be reduced to an amorphous body and category as against other more “orderly, controllable” entities such as security apparatus, people, even society. On the other hand, crowd is also mysterious and unpredictable, so the crowdsourcing could also display “the foolishness of crowds” by the discrepancies and senselessness performance commit by the participants (Lebraty & Lobre-Lebraty, 2013, p. 97ff.).

Dealing with inter-religious interaction is immediately immersed into the complexity, paradox, and multidimensionality the case at hand. Yet more, in a conflict situation there is no cut-and-dried solution that any well-defined elaboration could not put forward successfully. As the common phrase “experience is the best teacher,” and further emphasized by Dietrich Dörner, a German social psychologist in which he asserts based on numerous studies and problem-solving models that the most appropriate way in dealing with complex problem is oftentimes the product of long experiential process rather than of scholastic intricacy: it is “the hallmark of wisdom rather than genius.” The practitioners knew best in dealing with certain conflicting situation than the academicians. In this point Dörner pointed out the importance of learning system to educate the concerned parties to refine sensitivity to the problems (Dörner, 1996). Hence, lastly, IWS can be considered as a learning system, a “cybernetics” system that grows along with the interfaith dynamics. It learns from the context, from the best practices elsewhere, and from the relevant technology.

IIWS is managed by a team that consisted of ICRS’ researchers, staffs, and non-ICRS team members, consisted of ten people.⁹ The program time frame is between October 2014 and September 2015. There are four testing sites, i.e. Jakarta, Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi, and Central Sulawesi in which IIWS posted its monitoring officers. Those monitoring officers render regular reports to the central coordination in Yogyakarta.

IIWS provides a prototype of an early warning system in two modes of presentation: web-based information system that functioned as a dashboard of the “weather” map (see Fig. 1 and 2), and mobile app for the monitoring officer to report to the central coordination in Yogyakarta. As mentioned above, at the kernel of the web-based dashboard and mobile app is Ushahidi open-source software that ran on top of Google Android and Apple iOS platforms (see Fig. 3).









Fig. 1 – IIWS Dashboard model

⁹ The team structure is as follows: Dr. Dicky Sofjan (Principal investigator, ICRS), Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf (Researcher, CRCS), Dr. Leonard C. Epafras (Researcher, ICRS), Elis Zuliati Anis, M.A. (Program Manager, ICRS), Hendrikus Paulus Kaunang, M.A. (Monitoring Officer Coordinator and monitoring officer for Yogyakarta area, ICRS), Gunawan Primasatya (Monitoring Officer, Poso, Central Sulawesi), Muhammad Ihsan Harahap (Monitoring Officer, Makassar, South Sulawesi), and Agus Firmansyah (Monitoring Officer, Jakarta), Marianus Sandy Jehabut (Programmer and Website Developer), and Putu Hendra Semadi (Programmer and Website Developer).

Metaphor	Indicator	Description
Stormy 	Violence	One or more disputes parties are taking violence measures (limited or massive)
Rainy 	Crisis	Disputed parties exchanged threats
Drizzling 	Dispute	Disputed parties exchanged opposing claims
Cloudy 	Responsive Peace Capacity	Peace initiatives to lessen/to response to the tension
Sunny 	Active Peace Capacity	Peace initiatives to create social capital and to strengthen social integration

Tab. 1 – Simplified grading and metaphors
2014)

Source: (Ahnaf,




Fig. 2 – The implemented IIWS Web-based Dashboard




Fig. 3 – IIWS Mobile app




Fig. 4 – The working flow of IIWS

The IIWS system working flow is quite simply, as earlier has been summarized (see Fig. 4): in non-incident condition, and at the most conducive social interaction, in which most societal elements endorse social integration, IIWS system will mark it as “Sunny” condition in the IIWS Dashboard (see Tab. 1). If there is a tension, monitoring officer would report the on-site situation through IIWS mobile app (see Fig. 3) to the central coordination (HQ). HQ will clarify and verify the incoming information, the tension will be closely monitored by the monitoring officer within a period of time to identify whether the tension escalate/de-

escalate. Clarified and verified information will be appeared in the IIWS Dashboard (Fig. 1 and 2) and became an input for the relevant stakeholders, e.g. police force, religious leaders, etc. to take a necessary measure to prevent further escalation. IIWS Dashboard will dynamically report the update “weather” condition in its respective map.

There are two kinds of indicators being processed in IIWS: structural indicator and event indicator. Structural data is referring to the historical data of preceding incidents, and revealing the patterns, actors, victims, and violence history. The event indicator is the data related to the momentum of conflict. Both indicators help the identification of the conflict trigger and accelerator, and to predict the possible tension in the future.

Simple and straight forward, that is probably the first impression of IIWS system. The challenges and discrepancies in building such system however, is enormous. Technologically speaking, building a system like IIWS is manageable. The main challenge is not on the technological side, but on the content and methodology: grading moods upon certain condition and incident and transform it into proper weather metaphors is truly challenging. In the following are refined issues in dealing with grading and categorizing.

- Risk and danger are matters of perspective, and thus it holds social, cultural, and political implication (cf. Adam & van Loon, 2000, p. 4). Hence, there always contested understanding of is the meaning of risk and the way to prevent it. This is apparent during the earlier investigation in which the meaning of inter-religious tension is different among the four test sites. During the testing period, Poso (Central Sulawesi) generated the most reports from the monitoring officer. As the place of the bloody inter-religious conflict between 1998-2000, along with longer history of conflict, grading the social tension in Poso is much more rigorous than other places since there are layers of tensions as the residual effects of the past tension that precipitated traumatic experiences. Repercussion might be followed by quantifying this situation in IIWS Dashboard in which Poso area would under constant drizzling (dispute) or rainy (crisis) status.
- An indication in the conflicting area such as Poso above, some elements of security force is involved in the escalation. On the other hand, there is no civil society elements that powerful enough to make a balance on reporting. This complexity might also have included the local political dynamic, in which incidents are often taking place before the end of the annual budget

reporting. How such condition could be reflected in the IWS Dashboard?

- Based on the earlier researches (Ahnaf, Maarif, Asyhari-Afwan, & Afdillah, 2015; Bagir, Ahnaf, Tahun, & Asyhari, 2012) the conflicts oftentimes are taking place in the level of district and sub-district, hence makes it difficult to transcend it to the level of “weather station” grading.
- Determining the level of alertness, level of social vulnerability is very difficult in terms of understanding the actors and the nature of the conflicts. Is it hate speech, threat, and intimidation can be quantified as data feeding to the system?

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT

To address properly the above reflection is one of them through the taking of the technological intervention as a process, and to a degree, a social practice in itself. If this is truly materialized, then the risk, as metaphor and discursive entity, became something that is evolving throughout the testing process and implementation of application. Through these activities, the “risk” and “risk prevention” became another social skill, technological application, and a culture that cultivate a new discipline and practice. In other words, the engagement should take a rule of reciprocity (rather than reflexivity) of the risk as perceived by the implied society, as academic definition, and as the metaphor evolved in the technological practicing. This is could not deny the very fundamental nature of risk that it is ambivalence and indeterminate. The only hope through this mode of knowledge production and technological-induced solution is the learning process among the whole element of society, the stakeholders of social integration.

Moreover, there is strong moral duty, emphatic drive (*homo empathicus* (cf. Rifkin, 2014, p. 297ff.)), collaborative sensibility and consciousness, and social responsibility elements, beyond structural and instrumental approaches, on the success of the implementation of IWS system. The late coming of digital technology into Indonesian society may also give a blessing in disguise – despite probably temporal – in which that IWS could depend on the traditional social structure to enable a more comprehensive mitigation to the interfaith conflicts.

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