

Correlation

between Security and Development Program: LESSON LEARNED FOR MDGS FROM PEACE BUILDING PROCESS IN ACEH

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Indonesia is one of the biggest unitary states in the world with all its complexity. There is a long history of the struggle for national independence has a lot of side of story for each region in this country, especially in Aceh. Aceh is one of the regions of Indonesia that have a track record of insurgency for decades and during those insurgency era, the counter insurgency policy from central government was dominated by military strategy than the softer ones like a bigger right for Aceh to rule localized development policy. That military counter insurgency strategy failed to deprive armed conflict Aceh and precisely corrupt civilian rights on daily basis. In 2005, Indonesia and Aceh got the turning point of their relationship based on successful diplomacy agreement in MOU of Helsinki. In that agreement, both sides agree to delegated more authority to local government in Aceh. Nowadays, after 13 years, Aceh has been in its best fit of relationship with Indonesia and Aceh got more than enough significant enhancement in their development. This paper provides argument that there are strong correlations between development policy and security especially in conflict or post insurgency conflict area that counter insurgency strategy should not dominated by military force anymore but through bigger rights for local to pursue their development. This paper will be important as alternative perspective that development is fully integrated and holistic way with so many aspect issues even for security.

Keywords: peace, security, insurgency, local, development.



Background

Indonesia is a country that was born by collective struggle to colonialism. After colonialism were defeated and this country got its independence, it does not mean that Indonesia become conflict-free country. In post colonialism era, conflict in Indonesia was dominated by separatist insurgency, one of them and the the most significant were in Aceh.

History of Aceh was filled by great resistance to colonialism and their political will to preserve the unity with Indonesia. However, conflict between Aceh and central government of Indonesia could not be avoided and took a special insurgency case in Indonesia for decades.

Insurgency era in Aceh was happened for decades and dominated by military force than humanitarian approach and failed to achieve solid peace arrangement until MOU of Helsinki with its low political approach that gives more authority to local government, was achieved in 2005. Therefore, Aceh become one of special region in Indonesia that has a lot of lesson for learn in counter insurgency policy and peace building issue.

Based on those consideration, this paper will provide the alternative argument to show that even insurgency can damage national stability, it does not mean that military force would be the the most effective choice as counter policy. There were the other way around through humanitarian approach such as bigger rights for local development program.

In the end, this paper try to analyze the correlation between security and development especially for peace building process in Aceh. This paper will show that local development approach policy can be more effective way to counter even the most complicated insurgency conflict in Indonesia and hopefully this will be the academic alternatives arguments for another unfinished insurgency conflict.

Problem Formulation

How can security and development interrelated to each other?

How can the bigger right for local government of Aceh role solid and sustainable peace?

Literature Study

This paper try to analyze the correlation between security and development. First major literature is "Peace Building and Local Ownership: Post-conflict consensus-building" (Donais, 2012). This book explains the importance of local ownership in peacebuilding process and how local governement should be operationalized in post-conflict area.

The main idea in this book is that peace will not be achieved in the absence of local ownership. In the other words, counter policy for insurgency conflict with military force will never be the best solution but must rather be nurtured through patient, flexible strategies that calibrated to the intense domestic political participation.

The other main literature is about counter insurgency theory, "*Pemberontakan dan Kontra Insurgensi*" (Rekkedal, 2006). This book shows some explanations about the cause of insurgency conflict and provide some alternative point of views that counter-insurgency is not always about how legitimate national government kill the rest of insurgent but the other effort to explore options to build sustainable peace.

Additional literature come from the paper work pf UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, "Peace and Security" (UNDP, 2012). This thematic think piece shows the idea that there is changing paradigm in development issue like the absence of goals in development like Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) that relates to peace and security.

History of Insurgency Conflict in Aceh

Insurgency conflict in Aceh can be said as the most complex issue in Indonesia because of both Indonesia and Aceh have been in unique dynamics relationship since early independence era. In that era, there were internal fraction about the plan of integration process for Aceh to Indonesia and this debate were won by pro-integration group.

That early integration era is the best relationship that ever been between Indonesia and Aceh. The solid commitment of Aceh to keep integrated to Indonesia showed in the rejection from Aceh Government to the separation plan of Wali

Negara Sumatera from Indonesia in order to build Sumatera is separate country. In the side of Indonesia, Aceh was looked and mentioned as the most generous region to help the most insolvent central government. (Syahputra, 2006).

The amity phase between Indonesia and Aceh was ruined when central government by Republic of Union Indonesia Council decided to merge Aceh as special region to the Province of North Sumatera. That decision brought the relationship for both side to the different way around phase to the exhausting and complicated insurgency conflict for decades.

First armed conflict between both sides can not be avoided since the leader of Aceh at that time, Daud Bereuh, built armed forces in order to fight the special authority in Aceh and this event started the complex relationship dynamics for Indonesia and Aceh. Indonesia under Soekarno's regime tried to counter this first phase of insurgency in Aceh through military and diplomacy way such as amnesty policy for surrender insurgents. This two way policy succeed weaken military power in insurgency side for a while.

In 1961, armed forces of insurgency was weak but Daud Bereuh as leader persistently proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Aceh that was gotten great support from Acehnese. Central government counter this situation through renegotiation with amnesty and arrangement offer of special Syariah Act in Aceh. This renegotiation effort failed because of the changing regime from Soekarno to Soeharto.

In 1976, signifact insurgency resistance in Aceh was marked by the born of Aceh Independence Movement/GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) with Hasan Tiro as the leader. In 1989, open armed conflict was started between GAM and TNI. The armed forces resistance from insurgent was gotten strengthened and encourage Indonesia to assign Aceh as Military Operation Region/*Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM). In 1998, Indonesia under Habibie regime promised to withdraw that military status and back to gave amnesty for the surrender insurgents.

Since 1955 to 2005, Aceh had long resistance in political and armed way to Indonesia and in the time between that era, several reconsiliation had been arranged but not the sustainable ones because of the counter-insugency policy was still dominated by military force option through special status as Military Operation Region/*Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM) for several times.

Implementation of frequently military operation in Aceh for decades caused hard violation of human rights especially for civilians and destroyed economy and socio cultural condition. The failure of government to protect civilian rights during military operations raised less trust in Acehnese to the nationalism for Indonesia. There is report as illustration that shows violent during one year in 2003 for military operation in Aceh in the era of Megawati resulted at least 1326 violences to civilians. (Kontras, 2006):

That estimation report shows huge damage violations in Aceh during one year military operation in one regime only, so it can be imagined the destruction that happened in Aceh for decades because of military operation in order to guard national unity and nationalism. Minimum protection for civilian rights raise skeptical feeling of nationalism in Aceh to Indonesia and at the same time raise the opportunity for insurgents to collected more support. In the end, counter-insurgency policy that is dominated by military force option can only result vicious circle.

In 2005, Indonesia and Aceh met their the most significant turning point after decades of armed conflict through the achieved MOU of Helsinki peace agreement. That peace agreement arranges more right and authority for local ownership in Aceh especially their right in local development policy with minimum intervention from central government. This arrangement was legalized in form of law through national Act number 11 year of 2006 about Government of Aceh. This Act protects special authorities for local government in Aceh. Now It's been over 8 years since MOU of Helsinki and armed conflict between two both sides successfully muted.

Lesson Learned from Aceh for Peace-Building Process Through Local Developmet Policy.

Insurgency conflict have been becoming unfinished issue in some region in Indonesia. Some of them were finished right to the root of the insurgent movement, some of them have been in sustainable reconsiliation phase to prevent the conflict trap, and the rest have been in turmoil of resistance by insurgents. Issues like insurgency conflict in Indonesia can not be seen as rebellion to nationalism as taken for granted because actually nation building in Indonesia is still in process.

Therefore, it is important for Indonesia to look insurgency issue deeper than just the matter of nationalism and rebellion to the country.

There are some key points as cause of insurgency movement. The combination of some factors like ideology, religion, discrimination, and primordialism is used as the foundation of insurgency building. In general, insurgency in Southeast Asia is rooted in internal history factor specifically when that country was in integration process become a total brand new nation in the post-colonialism era. During the process that nation commonly was still in fragile economy growth and unstable national institution, the root of insurgency cause easily strengthened.

For a long time, counter-insurgency issue was dominated by military force as the best or even the only option. Ironically, that strategy become the domination although it is often that the root of conflict comes from injustice and discrimination of economy or specifically in rights of development. The simple logic can be concluded that the best solution to counter this kind of conflict is the arrangement for more local authority to develop their own region's potency.

The changing paradigm of security and development area makes significant contributions to give alternative options through local politics policy such as bigger development rights in local's hands. Taking local ownership as the main contemporary peace-building requirement make the consequences that actors in local stage must be the key actor as peace-builders because the sustainable peace can be cultivated by those who live with it.

There are some reasons why bigger rights for local government to develop their region can be seen as the essential peace building process requirements (Donais, 2012):

Because it raises the probability that reforms will be tailored to local circumstances, priorities and political realities.

Because those who have to decide upon and implement the reforms are more likely to perceive the changes as being in their own, or their country's, interests.

Reforms are more likely to be perceived by the public as legitimate than when measures are viewed as having been forced on the government from outside through the exercise of financial leverage.

Based on those points, it can be understood that now local government are seen as a key role in progressive counter-insurgency strategy. peace will not be achieved in the absence of local ownership. In the other words, counter policy for insurgency conflict with military force will never be the best solution but must rather be nurtured through patient, flexible strategies that calibrated to the intense domestic political participation.

There are some advantages come with the implementation of local development ownership like happens in Aceh. First, more authority to local governance especially rights in development area policy can address the roots causes of conflicts and will raise the renewal of political trust between local and central government. Secondly, bigger authority local governance give more guarantee that voice of local population can be heard in order to rebuild the trust of nationalism again.

Violent conflict has become the largest obstacle to the MDGs. Violent conflict causes death, disease and displacement, destroys physical and social capital, damages the environment, decreases school attendance and discourages investment. A broad approach to development will also contribute to peacebuilding. A focus on justice, human rights, horizontal inequalities, jobs and inclusive politics will reduce the risk of violence.

Development, human rights and peace and security are indivisible and interrelated. Each cannot be achieved without achieving the other. They should be viewed as interrelated dimensions of one goal whether called development, well-being or human security. They are interrelated conceptually as well as at the national level and the global level. Any deficit in one dimension, will have an impact on the other.

Those explanations shows that apparantly development and security have clear connection, that development will never be achieved in the absence of security in some region, and at the same time development can be the most effective cure for intra-state armed conflict. The problem is, those two things is still understood as different and minimum correlation things.

Long history of insurgency conflict in Aceh about how military operation policy in decades failed to achive solid peace agreement and suddenly the turning

point for both sides could be done through diplomacy way with commitment for more authority and responsibility to local ownership to role their local governance especially in development rights, based on their best local interest.

Conclusion

1. Traditional paradigm had the sectoral thinking that tend to separate some issue to each other failed to give best solution to raise development quality in some region especially in conflict and/or post-conflict area. At the same time, this traditional point of view also failed to give effective and sustainable solution in peace-building process because its domination views for military force than low politics approach like economy.
2. Violent conflict has become the largest obstacle to the MDGs. Violent conflict causes death, disease and displacement, destroys physical and social capital, damages the environment, decreases school attendance and discourages investment. A broad approach to development will also contribute to peacebuilding. A focus on justice, human rights, horizontal inequalities, jobs and inclusive politics will reduce the risk of violence.
3. Debates about which is more important whether development and security also broaden to the issue that central relationship in governance is not the valid system anymore to support development and security but with local ownership rights through special authority that give more guarantee from central government that local actors is the key role on their own interest.
4. Aceh is one of the most valid role model to provide prove that correlation between development and security is too strong to be ignored. Discrimination in national development policy encourage some local actors in Aceh to struggle for their rights that cause colossal military violence for decades in Aceh. Under traditional point of view, Indonesia decided to counter that insurgency with military force domination than low politics approach or specifically special autonomy to rule their own capital, then that military operation destroy civilian life and local development capital, and then that total damage become more justification of insurgents for their action against legitimate national

- government. In the end, that domination of military force counter-insurgency policy encourage the conflict trapped in vicious circle.
5. Aceh is one of region that had the most complicated insurgency relationship with Indonesia succeed become role model and prove of peace-building process that can be achieved through local development approach instead of military operation all over again. After decades of insurgency conflict, Indonesia and Aceh succeeded to achieve peace arrangement since both sides agree on MOU of Helsinki in 2005 that gives more authority to local governance in Aceh that was dominated with right to role local development by local actors. Now, after 8 years of the implementation, Indonesia and Aceh have been keeping their commitment on this peace agreement. This is the clear evidence that development can be the most effective cure to maintain the whole aspect of security.

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