Political Parties and Religious Local Ordinances in Post-Suharto Indonesia: A Historical and Genealogical Perspective

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Abstract

This study will focus on the relationship between political parties and the rise of religious local ordinances (*Perda Syariah* in Indonesian) in Post-Suharto Indonesia. It aspires to answer the big question of why political parties, regardless of their different ideological outlooks, support religious local ordinances at local level. In order to answer that question, this research will analyze various political processes related to the implementation of religious local ordinances, including coalition pattern, influence from pressure groups, rising Islamic fundamentalism, and political-economic benefits from supporting such legislation as well as different political realities between elite and public perspectives and local and national leadership of political parties.

Background and Importance of the Study

Political parties are one of the most important political actors in Indonesian politics. Although political parties had experienced the ups and downs in political dynamics of Indonesia, especially during the New Order Era, the spirit of political reform, democratization and decentralization in post-Suharto Indonesia has given political parties even greater role than before. As Erawan (1999) showed, this reform has provided more deliberative spaces for regional and local politics thus given political parties more freedom in political processes (Reilly, 2007)

This transformation in Indonesian politics consequently has reshaped political landscape of the country. Zenzie's research (1999) showed that due to the collapsing dominance of old political establishment, there have been significant shifts in political spectrum in post-Suharto era. However, the classical dichotomy of *Santri* (observant Muslim) and *Abangan (*nominal Muslims, secularists and minorities) in Indonesian society is still reflected in politics (Geertz, 1976). Hence the spectrum of political parties in Indonesia can be divided into two big camps: Islamic and secular parties. The latter camp can be further categorized into two different groups based on support from Muslims and political Islam: secular-exclusive group which is more secular in its outlook and avoids any kind of religious symbolism and secular-inclusive group which

is more accommodative towards Islam-based agenda and representation as long as it is in line with Pancasila, the state philosophy of Indonesia (Baswedan, 2004)

Generally speaking, both Islamic and secular parties have become more moderate in terms of their ideological adherence, meaning that Islamic parties become more secular in their political orientation and secular parties can also accommodate some agenda based on Islamic values. In terms of policy agenda, political parties also focused more on a practical political agenda rather than cultural and ideological differences (Sarjadi & Rinakit, 2004). Furthermore, as confirmed by previous research, political Islam itself has become more moderate (Hefner, 2001). There has also been a significant level of secularization among Indonesian Muslims (Assyaukanie, 2008). However, the difference in interpretation and expectation of Islamic values still exists among Indonesian society (Federspiel, 1998). The rise of religious local ordinances or Sharia-based legislations in Indonesia is the proof of this difference.

Assyaukanie (2007) recorded the rise of religious local ordinances in some areas in Indonesia. This phenomenon, although it looks relatively current, has actually originated in the early days of nation building, confirmed by the debates in the constitutional assembly (*Konstituante* in Indonesian) on the official philosophical foundation of the state and the inclusion of Islamic values and Sharia in the constitution (Hosen, 2005). As time goes by, this battle of values has been evolving until now, and it finds its modern manifestation in the form of religious or 'anti-vice' regulations in numerous regions in Indonesia, such as in Cianjur and Tasikmalaya, West Java and Bulukumba, South Sulawesi and even its Christian version in Manokwari, Papua (Bush, 2008). Moreover, recent research and survey conducted by Ali-Fauzi & Mujani (2009) confirmed the rising support for religious local ordinances. Nonetheless, as Asi (2007) argued, there is a gap between elite interest in central and local authorities as well as with public opinion in decision making process for the implementation of religious local ordinances.

Much research has been done in the field of political culture and Sharia implementation in Indonesia. Most of these studies, however, focus more on other socio-political factors outside formal political procedures and channels namely public opinion, pressure and interest groups and the trend of Islamic fundamentalist ideas (Salim & Azra 2003). This study therefore aims to propose another perspective to see this current political situation by examining and analyzing the dynamics and influence of political parties in relation to the rise of religious local ordinances in Indonesia. Thus, this study aims to highlight a wide range of political processes related to the role of political parties in the decision making process of religious local ordinances.

Scope of Research

This research looks at the relationship between political parties and their roles in implementing religious local ordinances. Specifically, this study attempts to discuss the impacts of Post-Suharto reforms, changing public opinions, domestic power struggle and interests, coalition pattern, especially between secular and Islamic parties, elite agenda as well as the influence of pressure of interest groups in shaping political parties' official stance towards the implementation of religious local ordinances.

For the sake of feasibility, accuracy and validity of research, this thesis tries to give a comprehensive review of political parties and religious local ordinances at national level. Nine cities (*kota*) and city-level municipalities (*kabupaten*) of Ali-Fauzi & Mujani's (2009) research will be utilized as the key source of case studies. This thesis will also exclude Sharia implementation in Aceh province and Christian version of religious local ordinances because those two cases have different socio-political environment that are outside the goals of this research.

Methodology of the Study

This study will use two methods. The first method is to analyze through primary and secondary sources the rise of religious local ordinances in several areas in Indonesia, the changing spectrum and role of political parties particularly in local and regional politics and the correlation between these two factors since post-Suharto reformation era through various case studies based on previous literature review. Official statistics and documents from government, elections, research institutes, advocacy groups and political parties will be used for this research because those documents will give valuable inputs especially in order to know official position or policy of political party or local government towards the implementation of religious local ordinances. The second method is qualitative through interviews of prominent scholars and party officials who are involved in the research, advocacy and implementation of religious local ordinances in Indonesia.

Qualitative analysis will be appropriate since it can provide an in-depth analysis of social context of research variables through deeper reflections based on various perspectives (May, 1997; Flick, 1998). Moreover, this study also tries to fill the gap of the literatures on political level and political parties and its relations with religious local ordinances since previous studies mainly deal with the issue of religious local ordinances on societal level. Both primary (official statements and policies from various institutions, particularly political parties) and secondary (previous researches on religious local ordinances) data will be used in this study. Nonetheless, it is possible that in the future quantitative approach can be implemented as well in order to give broader

image about the dynamics of Islamic aspirations, politics and democracy in Islamic world particularly in Indonesia.

Theoretical Framework

Two recent findings on political parties and Islamic aspirations in post-Suharto Indonesia will serve as the theoretical framework for this research. First source is the work of Baswedan (2004) who argued that Geertz's classification and political Islam will be instrumental in projecting the future of Islamist values and agenda in Indonesian politics. Baswedan's classification of Islamic, Secular-Inclusive and Secular-Exclusive political parties in Indonesia will be utilized in this research in order to compare different policies from different political parties. Second source is survey and research about public opinion on religious local ordinances conducted by Ali-Fauzi & Mujani (2009) which is the main secondary data of this research. This research therefore will fill the gap of the role of political parties behind the implementation and rise of religious local ordinances.

Political Islam in Current Socio-Political Landscape of Indonesia

In regards to the current political division of Indonesia, the evolution of political Islam is one major reason that contributes to the reform in post-Suharto era. This change in orientation is rooted in the late period of Suharto administration. Liddle (1996) noted the rise of political Islam and Muslim groups and the changing pattern of relationship between political Islam and government. This period was marked with the growing number of middle-class, young and educated *Santri* Muslims and their influence in politics and policymaking. Some of them even entered secular parties and Suharto administration, driven by the idea of "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No" by the late Nurcholish Madjid, a leading intellectual on Islam in Indonesia (Bakti, 2004). On the other hand, Suharto administration itself also started to be more accommodative to political Islam, giving support for the establishment of some Islamic institutions and civil society groups such as the formation of Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI) in that period.

In the era of democratization, generally speaking, political Islam has successfully managed to enter and fit into democratic political framework (Hefner, 1999). Nevertheless, outside the formal and electoral political system, the situation is much more complicated. More radical and fundamentalist element of political Islam, commonly labeled as Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist groups, has also come into existence. Some of these Islamic fundamentalist groups can be found as youth-based

organizations (Miichi, 2003). Some of them are mass-based Islamist organization, such as the Laskar Jihad (Jihad troops) that came into surface in the era of political transition (Hasan, 2002).

Compared to their moderate counterparts, Islamic fundamentalists are more militant to implement conservative interpretation of Islamic Sharia and include it into the existing legal and political system. It is not unusual for them to use more radical methods, such as violence, to achieve their goals. Hefner (2002) observed the rise of Islamist violence in the transitional era due to corrupted alliance among political elites, mutual distrust and sectarian feelings among different ethnic and religious groups, widening economic crisis, as well as the spillover of Islamic resurgence around the world at that time due to WTC bombings and US foreign policy. This violence has continued until now and even endorsed by some *fatwa* (religious edicts) by some religious institutions and leaders (Assyaukanie, 2009).

The Rise of Religious Local Ordinances in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Increasing role of political party and escalating Islamic fundamentalist sentiment in Post-Suharto Indonesia has reopened the old debates of values in Indonesian politics. As Federspiel (1998) argued, the meaning of Islamic values among various socio-political groups is interpreted differently, suggesting different approaches in incorporating Islamic values into socio-political and legal context of Indonesia. One example of this debate is 1989 religious judicature act, which was endorsed by the government after getting pressure from some Islamic groups to establish a kind of institution to deal with Muslim private matters, such as marriage (Cammack, 1997). The rise of religious local ordinances in Indonesia is a proof how the battle of values still continues within democratic socio-political and legal settings.

The rise of religious local ordinances is one of major features of contemporary discourse between Islamic values and democracy in Indonesia. Assyaukanie (2008) observed the rise of religious local ordinances in some areas in Indonesia. What makes this phenomenon different compared to previous waves of demand for Sharia implementation is its bottom-up process to turn Sharia into sets of regulations at local level, which is implied in the term "religious local ordinances". Recent survey and research conducted by Ali-Fauzi & Mujani (2009) analyzed the rise of religious local ordinances as well as public and elite opinion towards this phenomenon in nine regions in Indonesia, which are consisted of five municipalities, namely Pandeglang (Banten), Tasikmalaya (West Java), Banjar Baru (South Kalimantan), Bulukumba (South Sulawesi), and Jember (East Java) and four cities, namely Padang (West Sumatera),

Tangerang (Banten), Bekasi and Bogor (West Java). This study also focused on public and elite opinion, policymaking process and policymakers' stance towards the issue and media coverage, which gives a comprehensive understanding about the politics of religious local ordinances at local level. One important fact that should be taken into consideration from this observation is the gap between elite and public opinion as well as difference between public and civil society aspirations vis-à-vis political agenda from government, political parties or pressure groups.

In accordance to these dissenting opinions and positions towards religious local ordinances, there are three important issues related to the rise of religious local ordinances: failure of good governance, discrimination towards minorities and new revenue stream to fund and consolidate political power at local level. The first two issues were raised by Bush (2008) in his research. He argued that the lack of good governance, especially local capacity to deliver proper public access, triggers public support for religious local ordinances. In addition, the issue of discrimination comes into surface because the practices of these religious local ordinances are considered to infringe civil and political rights of minorities, not only non-Muslims and women, but also Muslims who do not share the same interpretation about religious local ordinances (Salim, 2007). The third issue is associated with how the implementation of religious local ordinances opens up new revenue and income opportunities for local political establishments to consolidate and strengthen their position in local political constellation (Buehler, 2008).

Another question to be posed is what kind of local legislations and laws considered to be religious local ordinances? Additionally, what kind of socio-political aspects regulated by these religious local ordinances? Based on previous researches of Ali-Fauzi & Mujani (2009) and Bush (2008), the term "religious local ordinances" covers a wide range of local or regional level legislations and laws aimed to implement and uphold religious values, particularly Islam. This category covers, but not limited to, mayor or governor instructions, village ordinances, code of ethics at schools and government offices as well as the local ordinance itself. These religious local ordinances can be divided into three different categories: 1) religious local ordinances related to 'public order and social problems such as prostitution, gambling and alcohol consumption; 2) religious skills and obligations such as reading the Koran and paying the zakat (alms or religious tax); and 3) religious symbolism, primarily the wearing of Muslim clothing (Salim 2007: 126).

Some studies have tried to spotlight the politics of religious local ordinances at local level. In the case of Sulawesi for example, Asi (2007) observed the dynamics of public

and elite opinion and realities of religious local ordinances implementation in some areas in the island. In Sulawesi, opinions of local populations and various Islamic organizations are actually quite divided. Moderate Islamic organizations, such as rural-based Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), urban-based Muhammadiyah and government-sponsored Indonesian Council of Religious Clerics (MUI – *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*) argue for a more substantial and contextualized approach to implement Islamic values in the society. On the other hand, hardliners such as the Committee for the Preparation of Islamic Sharia implementation (KPPSI – *Komite Penegakan Syariah Islam*), Wahdah Islamiyah and Bulukumba Muslim Association (AMB – *Aliansi Muslim Bulukumba*) are more militant in promoting textual interpretation of Islam and advocating the need to implement Sharia within formal legal and political framework. This difference of interpretation is also reflected in the perception towards the implementation of religious local ordinances from local government's viewpoint in comparison with the view of civil societies. For instance, in Bulukumba, government officials and local politicians claim that the introduction of religious local ordinances has significantly contributed to the decline of triple problems of alcoholism, street fights and crime and the number of Koran illiteracy among local population as well as the increasing number of women wearing veil and Islamic dress. In contrast, civil society groups give dissenting opinions on the establishment of religious local ordinances. From their point of view, the existence of religious local ordinances itself is a threat to pluralism and tolerance in society. Moreover, they argue that the claims of government on the positive impacts of religious local ordinances have many flaws. Some examples that are raised as inappropriate implementation of religious local ordinances are lack of transparency in regulations of zakat or religious alms, social conformity to wear veil for non-Muslims at some official occasions and the exception of banning of alcoholic drinks in tourist areas. From their viewpoint, this is the proof of inconsistency in executing the policy.

Another case study done by Zubaidy (2008) also showed the similar dynamics of politics behind religious local ordinances in Tasikmalaya, where 99.6% of the population are Muslims. This policy has also generated controversies between the supporters of Sharia implementation and the opponent of the idea. Similar to many other places, the polarization of local politics also occurs between government and civil society. Some cases such as raids on women during the night have sparked pros and cons towards religious local ordinances. Compared to Sulawesi, Tasikmalaya society is more pluralistic; however they have one similarity in common: conservative and puritan Muslims as the majority of population and political elites that are desirable to

implement religious local ordinances. Although the disparity between elite and public opinion as well as among different competing political powers exists, the trend of religious local ordinances at local level is the evidence of "Islamization" or "Shariatization" from below (Hasan, 2008).

Political Parties and Decision Making Process of Religious Local Ordinances

Since Indonesia has undergone democratic reform in 1998, several changes in political settings of Indonesia have taken place in the past few years. One of those changes is the resurgence of Islamic-secular rivalry in politics. Nevertheless, judging from the result of 1999 general election, Most of the voters favored a more plural and open mixture of secular and Islamic politics which is open for both sides, suggested in the domination of secular parties and relatively significant gain of Islamic parties such as Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P, Secular-Exclusive), Functional Groups Party (Golkar, Secular-Inclusive), National Awakening Party (PKB, Secular-Inclusive) and Development Unity Party (PPP, Islamic) (Ananta, Arifin & Suryadinata, 2004).

Several newcomer parties which joined the general election contest in 2004 had also in some ways changed the political composition in Indonesia. The rise of the Democratic Party (PD, Secular-Inclusive), which is the party of incumbent President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, altered the old dominance of established political parties (Liddle & Mujani, 2005). Similarly, the Islamic side also marked a relatively remarkable success with the emergence of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Islamic) which made a pragmatic shift from its Islamist stance in 1999 to a more moderate and policy-based party (Pribadi, 2005).

The latest Indonesian legislative election in 2009 also demonstrated the drift towards more secular politics over the Islamic one. According to the data from the Indonesian General Election Commission (KPU – *Komisi Pemilihan Umum*), the four biggest winning parties of the election are PD (20.85%), Golkar (14.45%), PDI-P (14.03%) and PKS (7,033%) (detikNews, 2009; Kompas.com, 2009). As can be seen from the data, all of the top three parties are secular parties (Both Secular-Exclusive and Secular-Inclusive). Islamic voice was mostly represented by the victory of PKS, which has already taken a more pragmatic outlook.

The move to the center of political spectrum can also be seen in the change of leadership in these political parties. PDIP decided to be committed to its brand of secular nationalism by reaffirming the leadership of its current chairperson, Megawati, who has been in power since 1998 and her closest aide, Pramono Anung, as secretary general of the party (Hasan, 2010). The change in leadership in Golkar, with Aburizal

Bakrie as the new chairman, did not indicate any major change in its ideology (Masykur, 2009). On the other hand, PD tried to move a bit further by including figures such as human rights activist Rachland Nashidik and liberal Muslim activist Ulil Abshar-Abdalla into the party structure (Amri & Galih, 2010). PKS made another pragmatic step by open up its membership to non-Muslims, who will have the same rights and obligations in the party as their Muslim counterparts, a policy that has created a lot of debates within and outside the party (Sunudyantoro, Pratama & Ridha, 2010).

Despite the fact that at national level Islamic aspirations, especially in its symbolic and literal interpretation, have moderated and become more accommodative and practical in their policy proposal and political agenda, movements of political parties in some areas especially those which implement religious local ordinances may indicate different orientations. Zubaidy's (2008) research on Tasikmalaya gave some hints on the influence of Islamic parties in advocating religious local ordinances in Tasikmalaya. In East Java Province, the Crescent Moon Party (PBB, Islamic), which is one of the few remaining pro-Sharia Islamic parties, argued that religious local ordinances are in the line with the legal system and values of any other religions (Republika, 2010). PBB also had another worth-noted experience of inviting Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, an Islamic fundamentalist cleric, to the party's anniversary ceremony, in which the cleric issued a controversial statement that those who do not supported religious local ordinances and Sharia implementation in general are heretics (CMM, 2006). Interestingly, in East Lombok in April 2005, the Pan-Islamist Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) along with PPP backed the forming of the Preparatory Committee for Religious Local Ordinances (Suharso, 2006). Nonetheless, this deviation of behavior is not only the monopoly of Islamic parties. As Ali-Fauzi & Mujani (2009) presented, in some places such as Tasikmalaya and Tangerang, the combination of Islamic (PPP and PKS) and secular (Golkar, PDI-P, PKB and PAN) parties in local parliaments made the bill-passing of religious local ordinances possible. It should be noted that secular parties such as Golkar even hold many important posts in the local parliament such as heading some commissions.

While at national level moderations process seems to be the major phenomenon, local realities offer different account of "Shariatization" through religious local ordinances. A lot of researches have been done in analyzing party dynamics at national level as well as rising support for religious local ordinances at local level, but there is an important missing link between these two phenomena, especially on how the decision making to pass religious local ordinances done in local parliaments.

Criticisms of Religious Local Ordinances

As a consequence of the rise of religious local ordinances, numerous criticisms from member of parliaments (MPs), experts and other elements of civil society have grown towards religious local ordinances. Some legal experts, such as Indrayana (2006) pointed out that principally religious local ordinances violate the constitution and the principle of *lex superiori derogate legi inferiori,* which basically means that any regulations cannot violate or contradict higher regulations or laws above them. He further elaborated that those religious local ordinances are in contradiction with Bill (UU – *Undang-undang*) No. 32 (2004) on local and regional government which stipulates that religious affairs are the domain of central government. These religious local ordinances are even not in the line with Article 12 of UU No. 10 (2004) which mentions that the bill can accommodate special condition of a certain region, due to characteristics and limitations of religious affairs that cannot be adapted in the framework of local government. Civil society activists such as Ghazali (2010) considered religious local ordinances as a threat to religious pluralism, because of its discriminatory nature and treatment towards societal diversity and minorities. Political scientist from Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI – *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*) criticized religious local ordinances merely as vote-getter, pragmatic political tools of parties (Muhaimin, 2006).

Several national MPs such as Budiman Sudjatmiko from PDI-P also voiced out his opposition against the local ordinances, basically on the same ground with the experts (Hapsari, 2010). Nonetheless, Head of Department of Politics, Law and Security of PKS, Untung Wahono has long denied such accusations of the role of PKS or other Islamic parties, although he did not say that he rejected the whole notion of religious local ordinances (Dani, 2006).

Civil society groups, particularly the religious ones, have also expressed their objections in regards of religious local ordinances. Religious leaders from both Muhammadiyah and NU, two biggest Islamic social organizations in Indonesia have stated their resistance to implement religious local ordinances in such a highly plural society like Indonesia (Wahid, 2009; Christanto & Widiarto, 2010). Other Islamic institutions such as the Center for Study of Religion and Culture (2008), an affiliated research institute of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah) also revealed how public opinion differs compared to elite opinion on religious local ordinances. According to the research, approximately one-third of the respondents answered that the implementation of the local ordinances can be considered merely as politicization of religious issues. The research also confirmed lack of

transparency and deliberative dialogue in decision making process and discriminatory practices towards minorities.

Conclusion: Party Behavior and its Pattern

One of the most difficult questions to answer in this research is to explain why political parties' behavior seems to have little to no correlation with their policy of supporting religious local ordinances. In an attempt to respond to this inquiry, a simple and brief explanation of political spectrum based on political parties' stances towards the implementation of religious local ordinances might be helpful to explain current political debates of religious local ordinances:

Left   PD   Right

PDI-P   PKB   PAN   Golkar   PKS   PPP   PBB

Fig.1 Political Spectrum based on the Support for Religious Local Ordinances

Even though the depiction of this political spectrum might be debatable, by putting these political parties into this spectrum, it will provide a clearer understanding of how different parties with different ideologies respond differently to the rise of religious local ordinances. The left side of the spectrum basically refers to secular parties both from secular-exclusive camp (PDI-P) and secular-inclusive group (Golkar, PD, PKB and PAN). On the other hand, the right side of the spectrum belongs to Islamic parties (PKS, PPP and PBB). Both sides of the spectrum show different orientations among political parties, and how these differences are translated into their policies towards religious local ordinances.

Starting from the left-side, the secular-exclusive PDI-P can be categorized as far-left, because of its staunch opposition towards the religious local ordinances, both by its central leadership as well as by its MPs. Meanwhile, PKB and PAN have a mixed reaction towards the implementation of the local ordinances. In terms of their platforms and supporter bases (NU and Muhammadiyah), PKB and PAN logically would not give serious support towards the implementation of religious local ordinances. Nevertheless, political realities force them to compromise some of their principles as self-proclaimed national, pluralist political parties. Consequently, in some places, they have to support religious local ordinances to secure enough seats in the local parliament. Interesting moves from the incumbent PD to move closer to the center can be described as an

attempt to attract more voters. It is important to note that PD is the new player of Indonesian politics, because it was established in 2001 and it has only participated in the last two elections in 2004 and 2009 respectively. Golkar, among secular parties, moves very close to the center, implying its ambition to maintain its political strength despite of the declining capacity of political machine of the party. It is important to note that PD is the new player of Indonesian politics, because it was established in 2001 and it has only participated in the last two elections in 2004 and 2009 respectively.

From the right-side, PKS, judging from its Islamist outlook, supposedly has a big interest to support religious local ordinances. However, probably in an attempt to show its open and pluralist side, it does neither publicly renounce the proliferation of religious local ordinances at local level nor support the local ordinances openly. PPP, at least at local level, supports the implementation of these local ordinances and even makes a joint electoral campaign with Islamic fundamentalist pressure groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in some places. The most militant one is PBB, which has not changed its stance as a Pro-Sharia Implementation political party since its establishment.

Nonetheless, this spectrum should be understood as an effort to simplify real political realities. Current political landscape of political parties and religious local ordinances is much more complex and complicated, especially considering various electoral and power struggle factors such as coalition patterns, electoral reforms, direct election for local leaders (*Pilkada* in Indonesian) and analysis of party behavior. Several authors such as Choi (2009), Buehler (2009) and Hidayat (2009) pointed out the emergence of the abovementioned factors in recent Indonesia's political development. Institutional analysis of political parties might provide an answer of why political parties support religious local ordinances. Nevertheless, as Peters (2000) and Koelble (1995) argued, under the umbrella of institutionalism itself, there are several different streams of institutional theories, which often offer different, if not competing, perspectives from one another. Therefore, applying institutional theories to analyze the complex relationship between political parties and religious local ordinances is no easy task, and it requires a cautious effort to examine this relationship through different viewpoints of institutionalism. While an in-depth research can be conducted to investigate various different electoral and political factors of the relationship between political parties and religious local ordinances, for the time being, this preliminary research will serve as the stepping stone by presenting a clearer image of genealogical and historical realities of complex relationship between political parties and religious local ordinances in Post-Suharto Indonesia.

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